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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AcxNowiXDGMzNT-LIABILTY or NoTARY.-Where the defendant, a notary,
certified that certain impersonators of the grantors were known to him, and
that they were the persons who executed the deeds, and the plaintiff who
accepted the deeds as security for a loan in reliance upon the certificate of
the notary was defrauded, held, the defendant was guilty of negligence and
must respond in damages for not fulfilling the requirements of Sec. i185 of
the Civil Code: that "the acknowledgment of an instrument must not be
taken, unless the officer taking it knows or has satisfactory evidence, on the
oath or affirmation of a credible witness, that the person making such acknowledgment is the individual who is described in and who executed the
instrument." Something affirmative in the nature of evidence of the grantor's
identity must appear, as an association with him in his relation to other
people. Informal introductions and occasional meetings are not enough.
Pac. 12.
Anderson v. Aronsohn (Cal., ig9g), 184
In a similar case, occuring about the same time, the District court of
Appeals of California sought to absolve the notary on the ground that the
fictitious grantor, whose name appeared in the deed, and the real owner of
the property were not one and the same person; but, in review, the Supreme
Court called attention to the fact that the decision was affirmed solely on the
ground that any negligence of the notary was not the proximate cause of the
loss. Brown v. Rives et al. (Cal.), 184 Pac. 32. All the decisions agree that,
where the notary knowingly or intentionally certifies to a false acknowledgment, he renders himself liable for losses resulting. People ex rel. Curtis r.
Colby, 39 Mich. 456. The authorities are divided as to the liability of the
notary for negligence, depending on whether the notary is deemed to be
acting in a judicial or a ministerial capacity. Those courts which adopt the
former view hold that the notary is not liable for negligence. Commonwealth
v. Haines, 97 Pa. St. 228. The weight of authority, however, as well as the
weight of reason -is with the view that- the act of the notary in taking an

acknowledgment is ministerial in character.

i CoRPus Juass 8io; Common-

wealth v. Johnson, 123 Ky. 437, 13 Ann. Cases 716. Under this view, the
notary is held liable if he fails to exercise due care in certifying the ac knowledgment, and his negligence is the proximate cause of the loss. Joost
v. Craig, 131 Cal. 5o4; State v. Meyer, 2 Mo. App. 413; Commonwealth v,
Johnson, supra; DmvIN, DaDs, Sec. 527a. Contra, if the remote cause.
Brown v. Rives, supra. But, it need not be the sole cause. State v. Meyer,
supra; Homan v. Wayer, 9 Cal. App. 123, 127. If the plaintiff is guilty of
contributory negligence, the notary is absolved. Oakland Savings Bank v.
Murphy, 68 Cal. 455; Hatton v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 208; People v. Cole, 139
Mich. 312. But, the fact that the plaintiff has relied solely on the certincate
of the notary is not deemed to be such contributory negligence as will bar a
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recovery. oost v. Craig,supra; Homan v. Wayer, supra. The notary is not
bound to certify as to the title. Overacre v. Blake, 82 Cal. 77, 8o. Nor guarantee the correctness of his °certificate. DmiN, DVXDS, Sec. 527e.
OWiS-VIOLATION OF
AuToMOBIEs-CROSSING AccmwNT-UNPGoisT a
STATUm-In an action by the owner of an automobile, not registered as
required by statute, for damages to said vehicle as a result of defendants
alleged negligence in not taking proper precautions to avoid the injury,
which consisted in a collision between the machine and defendant's train,
it was held that the violation of the statute as to such registration does not,
in itself, preclude a recovery. Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry. Co. (Vt., 1919),
zo7 Atl. x2.
In construing a similar statute of Massachusetts, from which the Vermont statute was taken bodily, the Massachusetts court has held in a series
of cases, beginning' with Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. Co., 202 Mass. 443,
that the Legislature intended to outlaw unregistered automobiles and to
give them, as to persons lawfully using the highways, no other right than
that of being exempt from wanton or willful injury. It is worthy of notice,
moreover, that in the same jurisdiction the court refused to extend that strict
rule to cases of injuries by or to registered machines when operated by a
person not licensed according to statute, Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155.
See also Lindsay v. Cecchi, 24 Del. 185. Connecticut refused to follow the
doctrine of the Dudley case, supra, in Hemming v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 661,
because the Connecticut statute merely imposed a penalty for failure to
register, whereas the statute of Massachusetts expressly forbade the use of
the state's highways by such unregistered cars. Stats. Mass. 1903, c. 473, Sec.
3. This distinction is a mere play on words, and shows that the courts will
seize upon the least straw as an excuse for not following the Massachusetts
rule. Well might the Connecticut court have held flatly against that rule,
as did the Vermont court in the instant case, which would appear to be
sound, considering the general proposition that, in order to put a person
doing an unlawful act beyond the pale of the law for the purpose of a recovery by or against him, the unlawful act must have a causal connection
with the injury suffered. 2 R. C, L. 12o8. In accord with the principal case
are 4tlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Weir, 63 Fla. 69, and Hyde v. McCreery,
145 N. Y. App. Div. 729.
BUILDING

RESTRICTIoN

COVZNANTS-NUISANC4-PuBLIC

GAUGE--In

an

action by property owners in exclusively residence district to restrain owner
of a ten car storage garage from enlarging it to a twenty-four car storage
garage, it appearing that there was a building restriction common to- the
neighborhood that "There shall not be erected any establishment for any
offensive business," it' was held, that since the garage will occasion noises,
smoke and odors, all of which will lessen the peaceable enjoyment and value
of complainant's property and increase the rates of insurance and other bur-
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dens, an injunction in restraint of the addition should be granted. Hohi v.
Modell (Penn, igig), io7 AtL 885.
Such restrictions will be construed strictly, but enforced so long as they
are of value to the dominant lot. Hibbard v. Edwards, 235 Pa. 454. The
construction and operation of such restrictive covenants necessarily depends
upon the words used. In Hammond v. Constant, 168 N. Y. Supp. 384, a restriction in a deed against "erection of any building offensive to good neighborhood or in anywise a nuisance" was held not to include a twenty-nine car
storage garage; the reason being that the covenant did not show an intent
to restrict the use to strictly residence purposes. But in Evans v. Foss, 194
Mass. 513, a hundred and twenty-five car storage and repair garage was held
to violate a restriction against "any business which shall be offensive to a
neighborhood for dwelling houses." In Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, where the restriction was "no buildings other than
dwelling houses with the usual outbuildings and no stables" it was held a
single car garage was not a stable, but the restriction being made in 1899, a
garage was not contemplated as a "usual outbuilding." In Hibb*erd v. Edwards, 235 Pa. 454, cited in' the principal case, the court held a garage was of
necessity both noisy and malodorous and in violation of the restriction of use
"For any offensive purpose or occupation:' An "offensive business" in an
exclusively residential district is probably a more inclusive clause than a
business actionable or enjoinable as a "nuisance" in a district of the same character. O'Harav. Nelson, 71 N. J. Eq. 16i, held that noise and odor incident
to a twenty-five car storage and repair garage operated in a residence, but
not exclusively residence, district was insufficient to obtain an injunction, but
storage of gasoline or cars containing gasoline in a frame building was enjoined, as a nuisance per se. Pendergast v. Walls, 257 Pa. 547, is the only
case reported in which a garage was held a nuisance per se. Sherman v.
Levingston, 128 N. Y. Supp. s81, held that a garage might be conducted so as
to eliminate or reduce to inconsequence its objectionable features. However
the existence of an exclusively residence neighborhood, was disproved. In
Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 7o2, a garage adjoining a day
nursery was held not a nuisance per se. And an "automobile station" in a
neighborhood of summer residence was likewise adjudged in Stein v. Lyon,
87 N. Y. Supp. i25. See Goldstein v. Hirsh, et al., 178 N. Y. Supp. 325
('I1).

NT.
n
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-WoRxMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-DIsvIGURE
-There was an accident resulting in a serious facial disfigurement, but it-was
established that the actual earning capacity was not diminished. Under a
provision of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended in
1916, an award was in each case made for the disfigurement. Held, the "disfigurement" clause in the New York act does not conflict with the U. S. Constitution. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution of the United
States does not require the States to base compulsory compensation solely
upon loss of earning power. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Bianc (igig), 40 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 44.
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A compulsory compensation law applicable to hazardous occupations and
-based on the loss of earning power is not contrary to the "due process"
clause. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. x88. Where there has been
-no provision in the act, authorizing an award for disfigurement, the injured
-employee has been allowed to recover damages in an action at law. Boyer
v. Crescent Paper Box Co., 143 La. 368 (loss of scalp) ; Shinnick v. Clover
Farms Co., 169 N. Y. App. Div. 236 (part of ear bitten off by horse). Under
statutes containing "disfigurement" clauses, separate awards are allowed for
disability and disfigurement. Stevenson v. Illinois Watch Co., 186 Ill. App.
con418. In Great Britain the phrase "incapacity to work" in the statute is
496.
C.
A.
(1912)
Ltd.
Sons,
&
Hunt
v.
Ball
strued to include disfigurement.
The court said, "The recent accident (loss of an eye already blind) has destroyed his market, though it has left his physical ability to work what it
was before." Lord Atkinson in Ball v. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., supra. This
reasoning coincides with the argument of the court in the principal case, i. e.,
that it would be of little avail to the injured workman that he was as skillful
after the accident as before, if the result of his dilfigurement was to prevent
general queshis obtaining or keeping his employment. For discussion of
26 YAx,
129-139;
Rv.
L.
HARV.
25
683;
Rrv.
tion involved see 13 MIcH. L.
5i. For
L. JouR. 618; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162; L. R. A. i9i6A 4o9, I917D
481.
A.
C.
C.
N.
i6
disfigurement question see note
CRIMINAL LAw-INTnN.-The defendants published pamphlets calling
upon workers in ammunition factories to "strike," to "unite for action," to
"keep the armies of the allied countries busy at home." They were indicted
under the Espionage Act (Sec. 3, Title 1,Act of June I5,1917, amended May
i6, 1918), on counts, among others, of conspiracy to encourage resistance to
the United States in the war with Germany and to incite curtailment of production of things necessary to the prosecution of that war. Held, there was
sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty. Abrams v. United States,
4o Sup. Ct. Rep. 17.
The expressed purpose of the pamphlets was to create opposition to, and
nor
interference with, the fighting against Soviet Russia, not to encourage
assist German militarism. Production of ammunition was decried not beRussia
-cause it was used against Germany, but because it was used against
as well. Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Brandeis;
dissented from the majority holding, on the proposition that the defendants
had not the specific intent required by the statute. The natural effect of the
to
pamphlets, he agreed, would be to curtail production of things necessary
and
the war with Germany and, perhaps, to cause resistance to that war,
the defendants might be presumed to know that such would be the result.
conseHe further agreed that ordinarily such knowledge of the natural
whatever
them,
produce
to
intent
sufficient
a
as
construed
be
would
.4uences
might be the primary motive. But, he contended, this effect on the war with
their
Germany was not the motivating idea of the defendants; it was not
primary intention-that being only to weaken the allied ability to fight against
Russia. This might be disputed, but as the majority opinion nowhere contra-
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dicts it, but carefully refers only to our war plans "in Europe," it may be
inferred that the court was agreed on that point. The disagreement is as to
the intent required by the statute. The minority opinion asserts that it required a primary and motivating intent to affect the war with Germany; the
majority assumed that only a subordinate, or constructive, intent to accomplish that end was required. Debs v. U. S., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252, in which
Justice Holmes himself delivered the convincing opinion, is perhaps distinguishable on the ground that, while Debs' purpose to obstruct the draft
was but incidental to his object of eliminating all war, yet it was a deliberately
intended effect, rather than a mere recognized consequence. No authority is
cited for either opinion, and as the issue is one of legislative intent, it is
obvious that precedent would not be pertinent. An analogy, however, to the
dissenting conclusion is found in Rex v. Williams, i Leach 529. There the
defendant was indicted under a statute prohibiting the cutting, defacing, etc.,
of wearing-apparel. The evidence showed that the defendant had intended
primarily to wound the person of the wearer, although he must have known
that in so doing he would cut the clothing of the person. The court held, in
view of the particular circumstances under which the statute was passed that
a primary intent to deface the clothing was requisite, and dismissed the indictment. Somewhat analogous also are People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. (N. Y.)
Pem115 and Delaney v. State, 41 Tex. 6oi. On the other hand, in Reg. v.
require.
to
not
dictum,
as
interpreted,
was
statute
a
bliton, 12 Cox C. C. 6o7,
a primary intent to do the particular wrong prohibited. It is well known
that some statutes, as interpreted by the courts require no specific intent to
break the law at all. Com. v. Boynton, 2 Allen (Mass.) i6o; Harper v. State,
9I Ark. 422. Under the interpretation given the statute by the majority, those
who incited the present coal strike would be liable to 20 years imprisonment,
were we still "prosecuting the war" with Germany.
DAMAGS-MWDICAL EXPNSzs-FuNERAL ExlNsxs.-In an action by an
administrator suing for the death of the intestate caused by the wrongful act
of the defendant it was held that he may recover the medical expenses necessitated by the injuries, but he cannot recover the funeral expenses, the loss to
the estate by reason of that expenditure having been prematurely forced on
it being the true measure of damages. Brady v. Haw (Ia., i919), i74 N. VI.
331.

The question whether medical and funeral expenses may be recovered by
an administrator suing under the Death Act has often come before the courts
and the cases are not in harmony on this point. Since the damages are based
solely on the loss due to the death it would seem to follow on principle that
medical expenses, being caused not by the death but by the injury should not
be recoverable under the Death Act. Boulter v. Webster, iI L. T. Rep.
(N. S.) 598. It has frequently been held in this country, however, that recovery may be had for medical expenses in actions by a parent as administrator for the death of a minor child. Rains v. St. Louis Railway, 71 Mo.
164. As to funeral expenses the courts are divided depending on the court's
interpretation of the damage clause of the Death Act. The question seems

238
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to have been settled finally in England by the case of Dalton v. Southeastern
awardRy. Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296, where Willes, J., interprets the statute as
or in
alive"
being
not
relative
the
of
reason
by
injury
for
"compensation
ing
other words as merely providing a substitute for the earnings of the deceased. -Under this construction funeral expenses would seem not to be recoverable and some courts in this country have adopted this view. Consolidated Tract Co. v. Hone, 6o N. J. L.444; Hutchinson v. West Jersey Ry. Co.,
funeral
170 Fed. 615. But it is generally held in the United States that
are
they
that
ground
the
on
damages
of
element
legitimate
a
are
expenses
a financial loss proximately resulting from the death of the deceased. Secard
v. Rhinelander Lighting Co., 147 Wis.614. The principal case has apparently
rejected both interpretations of the damage clause of the Death Act and has
selected a middle ground by adopting the "loss to the estate" of the deceased
as the true criterion of the measure of damages. Under this construction the
decision of the principal case appears to be sound. See 2 British Ruling
Cases 711.
DAMAGE--PROVITS---EARIG CAPAcrTY.-Plaintiff's husband, 'a blacksmith employing four or five assistants in his shop, and with a capital of
$2,2oo invested in his business, was killed through the negligence of the defendant. For some years the deceased had contributed $i,8oo annually from
the profits of his business to the support of his family; but this amount did
not constitute the entire profits of the business. Held, this annual payment
was proper evidence for the jury to consider as tending to show the deceased's earning capacity. Baxter v; Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. (Pa., gig),
io7 Atl. 881.
In every case involving loss of earnings, the true measure of damages is
the value of the plaintiff's services to the business in which he was engaged.
Gilmore v. Phila. Transit Co., 253 Pa. 543; Singer v. Martin, 96 Wash. 231;
Walsh v. New York Cent., etc., R. R. Co., 204 N. Y. 58. (See note in 37
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137.) And the value of such services is not measured by
the loss of profits of the business. Masterton v. Mount Vernon, 58 N. Y.
391; Goodhart v. Penna. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. i; Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber
Co., 54 Wis. 208. But in cases where the returns from the business are the
result solely of the plaintiff's physical and mental exertions, without a substantial investment of capital or the employment of the labor of others, profits
may be proved as tending to show the earning power of the plaintiff. Wallace v. Penna. R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 127 (boarding house keeper) ; Buckman-v.
Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 227 Pa. 277 (farmer and trucker); McLane v.
Pittsburg Railways Co., 230 Pa. 29 (huctster) ; Lund v. Tyler, ii5 Ia. 236
(fisherman). The instant case does not fall within the latter classification
because the returns of the business were not the result solely of the deceased's enterprise. Nor yet does it 'violate the general rule, for the court
expressly says that if the total profits were taken as a measure of earning
power, that would be error. But it allows the jury to estimate damages upon
a basis of this sum, derived from the business from which the deceased had
his sole source of income, which sum "represents a part of the net earnings
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which were produced through the claimant's personal direction." The inference that this sum represented the value of the deceased's services to the
business is based upon a careful analysis of detailed evidence concerning all
the circumstances of the particular business. To the same effect see Boggess
v. Bait. & Ohio R. R. Co., 234 Pa. 379. And Pill v. Brooklyn Heights R. R.
Co., 6 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 267, jt. aff. 148 N. Y. 747, where it was held that
the earning capacity of a corset maker employing two assistants was measured by the profits of the business. But see Silsby v. Mich. Car Co., 95 Mich.
204, contra. See also note in 52 L. R. A. 33.
DAMAG s-RuLZ or HxwEsT INammmATP VALtE-ILLEOAL SAIX or MA SToc.-Smith & Co. carried stock on margin for Berberich, and
wrongfully sold it without notice. Held, that the proper measure of damages
is the highest market value of the stock between the time of the conversion
and the trial. In re Berberich'sEstate (Pa., igig), io7 Adt. 813.
Concerning the measure of damages for conversion of property of fluctuating value three rules have been followed. First, the value of the property at
the time of conversion. Layman v. Slocomb & Co., 7 Penn. (Del.) 403;
Continental Diside Mining Co. v. Bliley, 23 Colo. i6o. Second, the highest
market value between the time of conversion and the trial. Shroul v. Sloan,
24i Pa. 284. Third, the highest market value between the time of conversion
and a reasonable time to enable the owner to replace the property after he
received notice of the conversion. Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 217; Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. Robbins, 144 Ind. 671; Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412;
Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193. What constitutes a reasonable 'time is a
question of law for the court where the facts are undisputed. Wright v.
Bank of Metropolis, no N. Y. 237. The language of the court in the principal case indicates that the court believed it had only a choice between the
first two rules. Clearly, the first rule is not a good one in such cases, for it
enables the converter to buy the stock from the plaintiff at its present value
whenever the wrongdoer so wills. And the second rule (followed in the
principal case) encourages the plaintiff, by delaying the commencement of his
action, to speculate upon the chances of higher markets. In addition, it is
decidedly in conflict with the well-established rule that a party is required to
use reasonable diligence to mitigate damages. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Campbell,
GINm

219 Ill. 312; Wick'er v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 94; 8 RuLING CASZ LAw

442. The third rule is consonant with the fundamental purpose of the law
(in cases not justifying exemplary-damages), viz., reparation to the injured
party; and the said rule also harmonizes with the principle referred to above,
because it requires the injured party to use due diligence to minimize the
damage. All the plaintiff can reasonably demand is to be restored to his
status as stockholder, and under the third rule he is allowed to invoke the
remedy of self-help within a reasonable time after learning of the conversion
and then call upon the tort feasor for indemnity. It must be admitted that
in case the injured party is financially unable to repurchase the stock within
the reasonable time, he is not restored to his former position under the third
rule, but this objection is applicable to all rules of damages. Damages, being
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per se a substitute, are, in the nature of things, an imperfect remedy.
also 12 MicH. L. Rzv. 491; 8 id. x42.

See

WITH RIGHT ol NAvIATIO.-In an action for
of a vessel for running through a fishing trap,
owner
the
damages against
held, that the instruction of the lower court, to the effect that "it was the duty
of the defendant to operate and navigate his vessel in the channel or usual
course in which vessels said river should be navigated" was erroneous, since
the failure so to navigate is not negligence in itself, but merely evidence of
negligence. Anderson v. Columbia Contract Company (Ore., 1919), 184
Pac. 24o.
The court found, however, that one exercising the right of navigation is
bound to use ordinary care and due regard for the property rights of fishermen. This is an interesting development of the old rule as laid down in an
anonymous note reported in i Camp. 517, where it was stated that if the
navigator acted maliciously and wantonly the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, but not otherwise. In Post v. Munn, i South. (N. J.) 61, 7 Am. Dec.
57o, the first of the American cases on the subject, the necessity of wantonness and malice, in order to hold the master of the vessel liable, is at least
strongly implied. Cobb v. Bennett, 75 Pa. 326, and The People's Ice v. The
Steamer Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229, are substantially in accord. See also, Hopkins v. Norfolk and Southern Railroad Company, 131 N. C. 463, and Jones
v. Keeling, 46 N. C. 299. Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89, takes the first step
toward the more liberal doctrine. There the defense maintained that because
of the paramountcy of the right of navigation, the defendant could not be
held liable except for wantonness or intentional wrong, and cited Post v.
Munn, Cobb v. Bennett, supra, and GouLD, WAMaaS, § 87. The court did not
attempt to negative the doctrine referred to there, but held that the rule
derived from them was to the effect that the master of the vessel is liable for
damage to fishermen if he has acted wantonly and maliciously, and has done
unnecessary damage. Since the defendant in this case could have avoided
the net by using even slight care, the court decided the damage had been unnecessary, and that the defendant was liable even though the hitherto important element of wantonness and malice were lacking. Horst v. Columbia
Contract Company, 89 Ore. 344, decided a year before the present case,
against the same defendant, went so far as to hold that reasonable care was
necessary on the part of those in charge of the steamboat to prevent doing
injury to the plaintiff's boat and net. This decision may have been affected
to some extent by the fact that the plaintiff, in addition to fishing, was
exercising a right of navigation, though one subservient to that of the larger
craft. It is worthy of note that the rule of the present case was approximated as early as x86o in a Canadian case, Foley v. Wolhaupter, 4 Allen
(N. B.) go and 167, where it was held that the navigator was liable for
negligence, and that wantonness and malice were not important factors. Two
of the judges in this case went so far as to lay down the dictum that in their
opinion, the right of fishing was just as important as the right of navigation.
No American court has gone so far as to question the paramountcy of the

FISHiaN--CoNFLICT
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right of navigation. A consideration of the relatively vast importance of the
right of fishery both in New Brunswick and in Oregon, where the principal
case was decided, may throw some light on the modification of the old rule
in these cases.
HIGHWAYS-LIABILITY Ol TRACTION COMPANY FOR OBSTRUCTING HIGHWAY
UNDER ORDERS OV COUNTY CoMMsSION4as.-Defendant traction company

dumped dirt on the highway along which its tracks ran; it did this under

orders from the county road commissioners, who wished to use the dirt for

the repair of another road which intersected the highway at a point near
where the dirt was dumped. No light or other danger signal was placed on
the dirt, and plaintiff was injured by running into the pile of dirt in the
night-time. Held (by a divided court), that defendant company was not
liable, as it had merely done a lawful act in a lawful manner, under orders
from a competent public authority. Shepard v. Utah Light & Traction Co.

(Utah, I919), 184 Pac. 542.
It is clear that a person who wrongftilly places an obstruction in a highway becomes liable to persons sustaining injuries thereby. Dixon v. Ry.,
ioo N. Y. 17o; Dunlap v. Ry., 167 N. C. 669. But under the Utah statutes
the county officials had the right to olistruct this highway temporarily for the
purpose of repairs, and this right was paramount to the right of the public
to uninterrupted travel; Lund v. St. Paul etc. Ry., 31 Wash. 28; Stern v.
Spokane, 73 Wash. 118. The court held that this was equally true though
the material was to be actually used in repairing another highway; and, there
being nothing unlawful per se in the manner of delivery by the defendant,
and the latter acting only under the direction of the county, its act was also
lawful. The holding is that the whole act was justifiable, except as to the
negligence of the responsible county official in failing to put up danger sigvals, which was said to be the proximate cause of the accident. The county
was not a party in the present case, and, under the Utah law, would be immune from any such action as the present. The defendant was considered
as a mere instrumentality of the county, and is expressly distinguished from
an independent contractor. The dissent proceeds on the ground that public
officials must not interfere with the use of a highway to any greater extent
than is absolutely necessary; that it was not absolutely necessary to dump
this dirt at this place on the highway in question; for the repair of another
highway, though it probably was convenient to do so; that, therefore, the
act of the county was unlawful and that of the defendant, acting under the
county, was equally so. This doctrine was also recognized in City of Louisville v. Tomkins (Ky.), 122 S. W. 174. A municipal corporation undoubtedly has the right to close a street or highway temporarily under certain
conditions. The real question here seems to be whether such obstructions
must be limited to those which are absolutely necessary, or whether the doctrine of reasonable necessity should apply. It is submitted that the doctrine
of reasonable necessity is based on more sound reason and would work out
more equitably. As applied to abutting owners this right was held to be
limited by reasonable necessity in Mfg. Co. v. N. Y. etc. Ry., 76 Conn. 311.
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In 2 DffON, MUNICII-Al CORPORATIONS (4th Ed.), § 730, speaking of the temporary obstruction of highways, the author says: "there need be no absolute
necessity; it suffices that the necessity is a reasonable one." Under this view
the decision in the present case is perfectly sound.
ILtEGALLY TRANSPORTING LIQUOR
LIQUORS-AUTOMOBIL
RtCrAIM.-The owner of an automobjile
sold it on instalments, retaining legal title until payment in full. The vendee
used the automobile in violation of the prohibition statute of Utah forbidding
transportation of intoxicating liquor, and the automobile was seized and
sought to be forfeited to the state as provided by said statute. Held, (1)
the words of the statute authorizing the officer to seize the "intoxicating
liquors, vessels and other property so unlawfully used" were intended to
include automobiles; (2) the owner may reclaim his property from the
state by proving his own innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Davis (Utah, igig), 184 Pac. 16I.
Such statutes have been held constitutional Mack v. Westbrook, 148 Ga.
69o; Maples v. State (Ala, 1919), 82 So. 183. The first point has arisen in
only two states (Oklahoma and Utah) because the prohibition statutes of
other states specify clearly that vehicles are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
In Sharpe v. State (Okla., 199), 181 Pac. 293 (under a statute giving the
officer authority to "seize the liquor, bars, furniture, fixtures, vessels and appurtenances so unlawfully used") it was held that an automobile is not an
"appurtenance," and hence not subject to seizure. On the second point, the
federal courts have taken a different view of forfeitures for violation of -the
revenue laws, holding the proceedings to be in rem and considering the property itself as the offender and therefore liable to forfeiture regardless of the
personal innocence of the owner of said property. United States v. Two Bay
Mules, 36 Fed. 84; Heidritterv. Elizabeth Oil Co., 6 Fed. 138; United States
v. One Copper Still, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 928. See also State ex rel. Prato v.
District Court, 55 Mont. 56o. But it has been held under prohibition statutes
that the property of innocent persons is not to be forfeited to the state unless
the statute clearly indicates the legislative intent to that effect. State v. JonesHansen-CadillacCo. (Nebr., i919), 172 N. W. 36. Such an intent was held to
be expressed in a statute providing that "no property rights of any kind shall
exist in the liquors mentioned in section one of this act, * * * or in any
vessel, fixture, furniture, implements, or vehicles, when the said liquors or
other property mentioned are kept, stored, or used for the purpose of violating any law of this state." White Auto Co. v. Collins, 136 Ark. 81. Where
no such intention was indicated in the statute, it was held that an innocent
mortgagee of an automobile should not lose his interest in the chattel because
the mortgagor used it for the illegal transportation of liquor. Scignious v.
Limehouse, 107 S. C. 545; Maples v. State, supra. And it has been decided
that an innocent owner of a vehicle does not lose his property because his
bailee uses the vehicle for the illegal transportation of liquor. Griffin v.
Smith (Ga., I919), 99 S. E. 386;. or when his property is taken without his
knowledge and so used. Moody v. McKinney, 73 S. C. 438. The explanation
INTOXICATING
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of the conflict between state and federal courts on the second point probably
lies in the feeling on the part of Congress and federal courts that the revenue

laws must be rigidly enforced even at the risk of imposing a hardship upon
an innocent person occasionally, rather than create an opportunity for evasion
of the law by exempting the property of such persons from its scope, while
the state legislatures and courts do not consider such an ironclad forfeiture
rule necessary to the adequate enforcement of the prohibition laws. On the
first point, the instant case is a liberal interpretation of the statute and calculated to give full effect to the legislative intent.
MA UAG-FRAUD JUSTIFYING ANNuLmxNT.-Plaintiff and defendant, both
of the Jewish faith, agreed to be married by a person other than a Rabbi,
upon defendant's promise that they would afterwards have a Jewish wedding. A civil-marriage ceremony was then had, but the defendant later refused to have a Jewish wedding, saying he didn't believe in it and that they
should live together without it. Plaintiff seeks to have this civil-marriage
annulled on the grounds of fraud,--dn the theory, that she would not have
married the defendant, had he not so promised, and that the marriage was
never consummated. Held, no fraud justifying annulment, there being no
misrepresentation of an existing fact,--"he did not state that anything was,
but only that something would be." Schacter v. Schacter I919), 178 N. Y.
Supp. 212.
As a general rule, it must appear that there has been a misrepresentation
as to a material fact, either past or present, upon which the plaintiff has
relied, before the courts will annul the marriage contract. The defendant
must have misrepresented that which was, and not that which would be, for
a misrepresentation as to future facts is not regarded as legal fraud, justifying annulment of the marriage contract. Farley v. Farley, 94 Ala. 5oi;
Browning v. Browning, 89 Kan. 98, Ann. Cas. 1914 C i288, and note; Di
Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 95 A. S. R. 6og, note; also monographic
the
note to State v. Lowell, 78 Minn. 166, 79 A. S. R. 358, p. 371. Though
plaintiff, as in this case, may regard marriage as a strictly religious ceremony,
and consequently find himself or herself, as the case may be, in a very disagreeable and disquieting situation, still the law does not protect against a
mere disturbance of religious convictions. It has been held that even though
the defendant has made misrepresentations, as to past or present facts, which
actually led to-a marriage under conditions inconsistent with the plaintiff's
beliefs and convictions, still no remedy will be given. Clarke v. Clarke, ii
Abb. Prac. 228; Fiske v. Fiske, 6 App. Div. 432.
MASTER AND

SERVANT-HIRER

or

TErMS AND

TEAMsTsRs

oF ANOTHER

LiArn FoR TEAAsT&R's N=EI=GNcm.-A coal company hired teams, drivers
and wagon trucks from an ice company to deliver coal, Coal company furnishing wagon boxes and directing drivers where to get coal and where to deliver
it. Ice company paid drivers and was paid by Coal company on basis of
amount delivered. One of the drivers mired his wagon, and, in unhitching
team to return it for the night to Ice company's stables, left wagon tongue
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extending over sidewalk. In suit against both companies for injuries received
through driver's negligent act, the non-suit of plaintiff with reference to Ice
company was held, no error, since, in act of delivery, driver was servant of
Coal company and it was liable, though driver remained in general employ
of Ice company. One judge dissented. Badertcsher v. Independent Ice Co.
et al. (Utah, igig), 184 Pac. 181.
Majority opinion is based on general doctrine that servant of A may, for
a particular purpose, be servant of B, though he continues to be the general
servant of A, and is paid by him for his work. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson,
212 U. S. 215; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 205.
A typical case under the general doctrine is where X manufacturing company
hires its servant to Y power company to repair the machinery of the latter
under its direction. Workman is the servant of the power company, while
so engaged. Delory v. Blodgett, i85 Mass. 126. In the principal case, however, the dissenting opinion is with the weight of authority in recognizing
a distinction that has always been made where a servant is deputed to perform work for another by means of instrumentalities belonging to general
employer. I LABATT, MASrZR AND StRVANT (2nd Ud.), § 53. In applying
this rule to horse-drawn vehicles, the continuance of general employer's
control over method of using vehicle, is in accord with weight of authority.
LABATT, supra, § 54, and cases there cited. See also 37 L. R. A. 70-74. To
fix liability, it is necessary to examiie the particular act in which servant
was engaged at the time. Wm. C. Scribner's Case, 231 Mass. 132.
When driver, by negligence in management of team, injuries third person,
general employer, as owner of team and wagon, is prima facie liable,--not
the hirer. Laugherv. Pointer,5 Barn. & C. 547; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees.
& W. 449, leading cases. See also Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556; Crockett
v. Calvert, 8 Ind. 127. This applies where driver is performing service for
hirer at the time. Quinn v. Complete Electric Const. Co., 46 Fed. 5o6; Joslin
v. Grand Rapids Ice Co., 5o Mich. 516. Basis for decisions is the fact that
the driver is intrusted by the owner with the control of the team, and is
responsible only to owner for its management. Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 124;
Reagan v. Casey, i6o Mass. 374. Responsibility of general owner has been
extended even to manner of unloading and delivery of goods. Higham v.
T. W. Waterman Co., 32 P- I. 578. But if it appears that owner of team has
given complete control tb hirer by terms of agreement, hirer, and not general
owner, is liable. Brown v. Smith & Kelly, 86 Ga. 274; Philadelphia & R. C.
& L Co. v. Barrie, 179 Fed. 5o. As to whether hirer or general employer has
control of team, following test has been suggested: could hirer have himself
taken absolute control of vehicle, horse and harness, taking them altogether
out of possession of driver? Consolidated Plate Glass Co. of Canada v.
Caston, 29 Cari. S. C. 624. See also instructions approved in Hershbergerv.
Lynch (Pa., 1887), II Atl. 642. Although driver may be ordered by those
who dealt with his master to go to this place or that, to take this or that
burden, to hurry or to take his time, nevertheless, in respect to the manner of
his driving and the control of his team, he remains subject to no orders but
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those of the man who pays him. Driscoll v. Towle, I8i Mass. 416.
generally, Sargent Paint Co. v. Petrovitzky (Ind., i919), x24 N. E. 881.
NtGLIGZNCZ PXR SZ-VIOLATION O SPED ORDINANc-PROXIMATU

See,

CAUSE-

A motorcycle rider was injured through the negligence of the driver of an
automobile at a street intersection. Both vehicles were exceeding the authorized speed of ten miles per hour. Held, the motorcycle rider was guilty of
contributory negligence per se by violation of the ordinance and could not
recover, his negligence being the proximate cause of the injury. Dowdell v.
Beasley (Ala., 1919), 82 So. 40.
The better rule is that violation of such an ordinance is not negligence
per se but is merely evidence of negligence. Scott v. Dow, 162 Mich. 636.
Some courts have gone so far as to consider such a violation no evidence of
negligence. Ford's Adm'r v. Paducah City Ry., 124 Ky. 488. However, the
failure to stop an automobile at a railroad crossing may be negligence per se.
Earle v. P. & R. Ry. Co., 248 Pa. 193. So also, the failure to slow down
before crossing a street-car track, the presence of which is known, is sufficient evidence on-which to direct a verdict. Westcott v. Waterloo etc. Ry. Co.,
173 Iowa 355. The decision in the principal case is fully supported in many
jurisdictions, Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, but it is to be justified rather
on ground of proximate cause than on the ground of negligence per se,
L. R. 28
Cf. 17 MICH. L. Rv. 275, 3 COLUMBIA L.R 344, ioib 367, i9 HAv.
982.
b.
io N. C. C. A. 82o, 13
NUISANCg--gSPNSIBILITY roR Acrs op TnIRD PARTIS--INJUNCTIONINTFRr4RENC-THE GERMAN OpsRA CAsz.-Plaintiff corporation,

RXECUTMIV

organized for the purpose of giving musical performances, had contracted to
give a series of operas in German during the season of 1919-I92O. There
was much public hostility to the proposed project, and, before the first performance, the mayor of the city, on petition of the American Legion, allowed
a hearing to those who favored and those who opposed the proposed performances. The opening performances produced riotous demonstrations, which
necessitated calling out large bodies of police, and resulted in various severe
injuries. The mayor having subsequently prohibited these performances
until the peace treaty shoulid be ratified, the plaintiff secured an injunction
pendente lite, restraining the mayor. This case comes up on a motionof ifhe
plaintiff to continue this injunction pendente lite. Held, the mayor could
prohibit such performances as these, and the court denied the motion of the
plaintiff corporation, at the same time vacating the temporary restrainifig
order. Star Opera Co., Inc. v. Hylan et al. (1919), 178 N. Y. S.179.
Many jurisdictions admit the fact that an act, innocent in itself, may at
times be carried on under such circumstances as to become a nuisance.
Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 159 Mass. 147; Kissel v. Lew4, i56 Ind. 233;
Cronin v. Bloemecke, 58 N. J.Eq. 313; Harrison v. The People, ioi Ill. App.
224. These cases show that a lawful act will be enjoined, if and when it
becomes a nuisance, either by indictment or by private bill; but the case
under discussion differs from these, and is peculiar, in that it is not the acts
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of the plaintiff that create the nuisance, but rather the acts of third parties
over whom the plaintiff has no control. It is clearly settled in the law of
England that "a man is or may be liable to an indictment for attracting, even
by something lawfully done on his own premises, a crowd in the street adjoining his premises," Lyons, Sons Company v. Gulliver and The Capital
Syndicate, Ltd., 78 J. P. 98, xoo; Bettertons' Case, Holt 538; Rex v. Moore,
3 B. and Ad. 184; Rex v. Carlile, 6 Car. and P. 636; Walker v. Brewster,
L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Inchbald v. Robinson and Barrington, L. R. 4 Ch. 388; Wagstaff v. Edison Bell Phonograph Corp., Ltd., io T. L. . 8o. See, also, 78
J. P. 170, "NuisANCZS By THxATzR Quzujs-OccuPiERs ADJOINING THE
HIGHWAY." However, in the United States this proposition is not so well
settled, and practically the only precedent, in addition to those cited by the
court, found in our reports, is Seastream v. New Jersey Exhibition Co., 67
N. J. Eq. 178, where Sunday baseball games were temporarily enjoined, when
the crowd attracted by them became a nuisance to adjoining property owners.
The present case is also peculiar in the way in which the question arises. It
is not a, suit to enjoin the opera company from producing German opera, but
is a motion by the opera company for a continuation of an injunction pendente lite, restraining the mayor from interfering with such production,and the mere fact that this motion was denied would not necessarily mean
that an injunction would be given in a suit of the former kind against the
opera company. The court recognizes that it is denying the plaintiff the
exercise of a right or privilege, but it is *notappirent from the report whether
the court bases its decision primarily upon the relative unimportance of this
privilege as compared with the serious consequences of its exercise, or
*primarily upon the ground that the court would have enjoined its exercise
if suit were brought against the plaintiff seeking such injunction. If the
decision rests upon the second ground, it is apparent that the courts of this
cointry are adopting and following a well-settled principle in the law of
England. See cases cited, supra.
NUISANCZ--UNDhaTAKING ESTABLISHMENT IN PURELY RSIDMNTIAL DISTRICT A "NuISANCm.-Action to restrain defendant from continuing an un-

dertaking establishment in a purely residential district. It was shown that
the occupants of adjacent houses were mentally depressed by its presence;
that they lived in constant fear of contagion; that property in the vicinity
was being decreased in value, and that there was a remote probability of
transmission of contagious disease. Held, a nuisance under a statute providing that anything such as "to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property is a nuisance." Goodrich v. Starrett (Wash.,
1919), 184 Pac. 220.

The business of an undertaker is not a nuisance per se and the burden of
showing that it is a nuisance is on the complainant. Westcott v. Middleton,
43 N. J. Eq. 478. One ground for the decision in the principal case and in
Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. x47, W. of W., 6i Wash. 23o, was the
mental inquietude and depression caused by the presence of death, the conveying in and out of bodies, the conducting of funerals, etc. It has also been
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reheld that such mental depression, horror and dread lower vitality and
sistance to disease, and deprive the home of the comfort and repose to which
was
the owner is entitled. Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295 (undertaker). It
decided however in Westcott v. Middleton, supra, that the discomfort must be
produced through the organs of the senses and not by imagination or a morbid taste. It appears also that the depressive effects of thoughts of death
when occasioned by a cemetery do not constitute "sensible personal discomfort" which the law will recognize. Monk v. Packard,71 Me. 3o9; and that
such suggestions afford no ground for relief even when sufficient to lessen
the market value of adjacent premises. Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Assn,
of
1o3 Wash. 429; and that contemplation of death may even be beneficial and
a "salutary influence." Ellison v. Commissioners of Town of Washington,
se. Kingsbury
58 N. C. (5Jones' Eq.) 57. A cemetery is not a nuisance per
v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479; but may become such by reason of its location or
condition. Monk v. Packard,supra. A private or public tomb or cemetery
is not a nuisance unless it corrupts the atmosphere with unwholesome or
noxious stenches, or corrupts the water of wells or -springs or impregnates
the soil with noxious gases or substances. WooD, NU.sANCZS, 3rd Ed., p. 6-12,
and cases cited. In actions against hospitals or sanitariums, fear of contagion, even when unreasonable and scientifically unfounded, has been made
the basis of injunctive relief. Everett v. Paschall,6I Wash. 47; Stotler v.
Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86. See also note in 17 MicH. L. Rzv., p. 428.
BY THIM PfnSONS-MXASURX or DAMAGES.-In review of an action for slander wherein evidence of unauthorized and unprivileged repetitions of the statement was allowed to prove the full measure of
damages and such evidence was later struck from the record. Held, reversing the lower court, the admission of this evidence was error,--unauthorized
and unprivileged repetitions of a slander, current rumors and -reports of it
are not to be anticipated by the originator, and damages resulting therefrom
are not the natural or probable consequences of his utterance; the intervening
repetitions, rumors, or reports are the proximate cause of such damages.
Maytag v. Cummins (C. C. A., 8th Circ, 1919), 26o Fed. 74.
This is the general authoritative rule in this country today, Elmer v. Fes.senden, 151 Mass..359, 5 L. R. A. 724; Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, i88 Ala. 272,'Ann. Cas. igi6E, goo, 25 Cyc. 5o6, note 82; and a plaintiff
may recover from the original utterer of a slander only so much damages as
a jury thinks ensued from the original utterance, considered by itself. The
basis of this rule, as stated in the principal case, is that evidence of repetitions,
reports, and rumors of the original utterance will be hearsay, simple or
multiple, within the ban of the hearsay rule, and morever, for each unauthorized and unprivileged repetition a party has his action against the utterer.
But in a clear and well-reasoned dissent from the general rule laid down
above, Stone, J., states the counter rule,-that evidence of unauthorized and
unprivileged repetitions of defamatory statements is admissible in defamation cases-upon the theory that the defendant is responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of his slanderous utterance,--and whether the
SLANDMR-RFPzTITIONS
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subsequent repetition or rumor is such a consequence is a matter of fact
ordinarily to be determined by the jury, citing in support, Merchants' Ins. Co.
v. Buckner, 98 Fed. 222; Williams v. Fulks, 113 Ark. 82; Moore v. Stevenson,
27 Conn. 14; Zier v. Hoff in, 33 Minn. 66, 53 Am. Rep. 9; Rice v. Cottrel, 5
R. I. 340. The reasoning in support of the rule is as follows: all compensatory damages are based upon injury actually suffered from the wrongful act
of the defendant and its natural and probable consequences. The extent of
injury in defamation is unique in orie very important feature, in that it
depends almost entirely upon the extent of the circulation of the defamation.
The more wide-spread the circulation of rumors, reports, and repetitions,
that is, the greater the damage, the more intangible and difficult the fixing of
the responsibility for the injury as a whole. Hence justice to one slandered,
in measuring damages, as well as a protection to the defendant against excessive damages requires that such evidence should be allowed. And the rule
of law being that a man is liable in damages for his wrongful act and all its
natural and probable consequences, why should a rule of evidence, technically
applied, exclude from the jury evidence that they may consider in determin'ing what are natural and probable consequences? The admission of such
evidence for such a purpose would effect full and satisfactory justice for the
plaintiff in slander cases where the defamatory statements are widely circulated, thus replacing the practical distressing situation of today, recovery
varying inversely to the injury, with a .recovery directly proportioned to the
injury suffered.
TrucOPAPHS AND TaLrPHoN s-LIABILITY FOR UNRXPXAT4D MtssAOES.-The

plaintiff sent a reply telegram to his agent, in another state, in which the
defendant company made an error in transmission, so that the plaintiff's
agent sold land for $So, instead of $55 per acre, and the plaintiff sues for
damages. There were the usual printed stipulations on the telegram blank,
limiting the liability of the company, for mistakes in transmission, to the
price of the telegram, unless repeated, and in any event to $50 unless a greater
value was declared in writing, and an additional rate was paid. Held, in the
absence of a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the
stipulation was invalid, even though an interstate telegram. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Southwick (gIg, Texas), 214 S. W. 987.
Since the act of Congress, June 18, 191o, c. 3o9, Sec. 7 (U. S. Compiled
Statutes 1913, Sec. 8563) telegraph and telephone companies have been carriers within the meaning of that act, as far as interstate business was concerned, and have been under the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
various state jurisdictions have been in conflict as to whether telegraph companies could limit their liability for error in transmission due to negligence,
although the tendency has been toward the rule that they could not. 2 MicH.
L. Rrv. Po. The Supreme Court of the United States had held in the case
of a cipher message, that such a limitation was reasonable and valid, although
they held that a telegraph company was not a common carrier. Priinrosev.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. z. At the present time the courts
differ as to the application of Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
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supra, in controlling them, because it was a cipher message. The following
late cases have held Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., controlling.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bank of Spencer, 53 Okla. 398; Boyce v,
Western Union Telegraph Co., i19 Va. x4; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Jones,
7 Ohio App. go; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dant, 42 App. D. C. 398;
Meadows v. Postal Telegraph and Cable Co., 173 N. C. 24o; Williams v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 203 Fed. i4o. But in some other jurisdictions they
have held that "until the Federal Supreme Court, which has final authority
in the matter, shall decide otherwise, we hold that state law applies to the
telegraph and telephone business, even though it may incidentally affect interstate commerce, etc.," thus refusing to recognize Primrose v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., supra. Dickerson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 114 Miss.
115; Des Arcs Oil Mill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 132 Ark. 335; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bailey, io8 Tex. 427; Harrisv. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 136 Ark. 63. But in view of the decisions, in relation to carriers, beginning with Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 and
ending with Geo. N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278, commented on in 17 MIxC. L. RXv. 183, and volumes there cited, there can be
little doubt that the Supreme Court will hold these stipulations reasonable and
valid, contrary to the decision in the principal case. [See Postal TelegraphCable Co. v. Warren-Goodwin Lumber Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, igig), to
be noted in January number of this Review, settling law contra to principal
case.]

